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In his 1980 book Great Planning Disastersi, Peter Hall argued that there are two ‘rather 
different but related’ meanings of planning. Firstly, it might ‘refer to a set of processes 
whereby decision-makers engage in logical foresight before committing themselves’ – 
processes he notes which are ‘common to the planning of many public activities: 
defence, economic development, education, public order and welfare’. Secondly, the 
word planning ‘can refer to processes that result in a physical plan showing the 
distribution of activities and their related structures (houses, factories, offices, schools) 
in geographical space’, the kind of planning often described as ‘physical planning, or 
town and country planning, or urban and regional planning’ (or environmental, or 
spatial planning). One of the startling things, amongst many, about the period leading-
up to and since the UK’s 2016 EU referendum has been the revelation that 
departments of UK government did not apparently engage in any kind of planning for 
the eventuality of a vote to leave the EU.ii  Planning for a possible UK exit from the EU 
might have most obviously implied a requirement for the first kind of planning identified 
by Hall, as a process of ‘logical foresight’ - for example, planning for impacts on 
different sectors of the economy. And whilst it would be unlikely to involve planning in 
the second sense mentioned above, there would have been scope to consider the 
effects on different places (‘in geographical space’ to use Hall’s terms) – not least as 
the territorial effects of leaving the EU are anticipated to be varied. It seems though 
that there was little appreciation at the heart of the UK state of William McDonough’s 
satisfyingly circular dictum that “planning is most effective when it is practiced in 
advance”!  
 
But ‘It is never too late to start planning’! After all, the UK has not actually left the EU 
yet, and the Article 50 process allows plenty of time to conduct preparatory work - the 
undertaking of Impact Assessments (IAs) perhaps? The preparation of the latter has 
become customary practice as part of ‘processes whereby decision-makers engage 
in logical foresight before committing themselves’ (to use Hall’s words). So despite the 
false start around anticipating and planning for the impacts of the UK leaving the EU, 
it has been very reassuring to hear David Davis, the UK government’s ‘Secretary of 
State for Exiting the European Union’ state repeatedly for over a year that his 
‘Department for Exiting the European Union’ (DExEU) has been preparing 50 to 60 
studies on the implications of the UK leaving the EU for different sectors and that these 
contained ‘excruciating detail’iii.  
Oddly, however, Mr. Davis also displayed a marked reluctance to share these 
documents with Parliament, business, and the British people, until a Labour Party 
Parliamentary motion was passed, asking him to release the studies to the Exiting 
the European Union Select Committee. Subsequently, on 6 December 2017, in giving 
evidence before this committee, he finally admitted that that ‘no such systematic IAs’iv 
had been carried outv. Leaving aside the issue of why Davis might have sought to 
convey an impression over many months that such studies were being prepared when 
apparently they do not exist, his admission was extraordinary.  
The kinds of analyses at the heart of the ongoing controversy around the UK leaving 
the EU are routinely prepared in the context of drafting government policies and were 
until recently called Regulatory Impact Assessments. The government template which 
provides a list outlining the purpose and focus of an IA, states these should include:  
 a “description of the problem under consideration’,  
 [the] rationale for [the] intervention;  
 [the overall] policy objective,  
 [a] description of options considered (including status-quo),  
 monetised and non-monetised costs and benefits of each option (including 
administrative burden);  
 [the] rationale and evidence that justify the level of analysis used in the IA 
(proportionality approach);  
 risks and assumptions;  
 direct costs and benefits to business calculations  
 [… and what is referred to as] wider impacts”.  
 
With regards to wider impacts, reference is made to an IA Toolkit, which was released 
by the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) in 2011. This document 
reveals that the approach used is broadly in line with an internationally accepted 
understanding of what IAs should look like.  They are participatory, transparent and 
open decision support procedures, consisting of various (logical) steps. The 
assessment of different options is at the heart of assessment, focusing on various 
economic and other impact areas.   
 
The ubiquity of IAs as part of government’s processes of ‘logical foresight’, perhaps 
explains why Davis sought to circumnavigate some of the Select Committee’s 
questions and criticisms by stating ‘You use the word impact assessment. I’ve been 
using the word sectoral analysis. They are different, right?’  He added that ‘People 
seem to assume an impact assessment consists of a quantitative forecast’ and that 
issues such as whether the UK should leave the EU customs union were also based 
on ‘a judgment made on qualitative things, but not a quantitative one’.  IAs are indeed 
distinctive from purely quantitatively based tools such as Cost-benefit Analyses 
(CBAs) used in various forms since the mid-19th century in justifying investment 
decisions, emerging in the 1970s and being initially associated with Environmental 
impact Assessments (EIAs) before being applied in a multitude of other fields, 
including health, social impact studies and sustainable development.vi  So if DExEU 
has not been doing solely quantitative economic assessments – not least perhaps as 
Davis stated he was ‘not a fan of economic models because they have all proven 
wrong’vii, then which other analyses had been undertaken (in-keeping with standard 
government practice)?  His semantical side-stepping around ‘assessments’ and 
‘analyses’ could not obfuscate the fact that, as the Committee Chair Hillary Benn MP 
suggested, it was strange when ‘the government undertakes Impact Assessments on 
all sorts of thing all of the time that on the most fundamental change that we are facing 
as a country you’ve just told us that the Government hasn’t undertaken any impact 
assessments at all’.viii  Mr Davis’s position, however, was that the usefulness of these 
such assessments would be ‘near zero’ in the context of the scale of change likely to 
be unleashed by the UK leaving the EU. So when things get too complicated any 
attempt at logical foresight is futile should we just hope for the best? A further insight 
into the SoS’s attitude was provided by his subsequent statement ‘What's the 
requirement of my job? I don't have to be very clever, I don't have to know that much, 
I do just have to be calm’.ix So there we have it - the ‘Exiting of the EU and the Victory 
of the Know-Nothing school’!x.  
 
Yet given usual practice, and in-keeping with the spirit of ‘logical foresight’ evoked by 
Peter Hall, might not comprehensive and participatory IAs help government to make 
informed and transparent decisions about future policy choices, considering, not just 
sectoral, but wider-economic, societal, environmental and spatial impacts of different 
optionsxi? One issue they might address is the potentially differential regional effects 
of leaving the EU – given that for some regions economic and other consequences 
are likely to be more severe than for othersxii.   In this context, the ‘Territorial Impact 
Assessment’ (TIA)xiii instruments originally developed in order to help understand 
potential impacts of EU policies (e.g. directives and funding programmes) on different 
European regions could play a role.  In the EU context their rationale is connected to 
the Treaty objective of promoting territorial cohesion and the aspiration of fostering 
every region within the EU in realising its full potential for long term sustainable 
development. But methodologically TIA could also be used to assess the impacts on 
places of leaving the EU. For example, from a regional policy perspective, as Kevin 
Morgan notes ‘Brexit raises an issue that dwarfs all others and it is this: will London 
provide the same level of support after 2020 that is currently on offer from Brussels?’xiv.  
 
But aside from changes in regional funding allocations, another impact on places may 
be the opportunity costs of diverting scarce resources and attention from authentic 
national policy challenges like housing, social care and health. These costs may be 
high and are likely to impact disproportionality ‘in geographical space’ on those places 
and communities that can least afford to bear them. Given that TIA considers social, 
economic and administrative impacts, it may help assess such differential economic, 
social, environmental, UK-wide and regional effects of leaving the EU.  It might even 
help decision makers and citizens anticipate with ‘logical foresight’ the impacts and 
consequences, try plan to mitigate these as best they can, and develop their resilience 
in the face of an uncertain futurexv 
 
 
 
 Conclusion 
 
Peter Hall defined a planning disaster as ‘any planning process that is perceived by 
many people to have gone wrong’. It is certainly sobering to consider the governmental 
handling of the EU referendum, and its aftermath from this perspective.  Hall also noted 
that in some of the cases covered in Great Planning Disasters that even if the ‘outcome 
might not have been very different’, better planning may have meant that ‘in all, the 
decision would have been taken more consciously, more rationally, with greater 
knowledge of likely consequences, and in the last resort more democratically’.  
However, Taylor and Hurley also note the human ‘propensity to unconsciously 
reimagine information to fit our own theories and existing worldviews’ and how ‘when 
we lack information, we ‘default to these views’, adding that ‘even if the implications of 
new information challenge an existing idea, it will be reimagined of discarded’.  The 
cognitive bias of decision makers and populations may thus mean that more 
knowledge of the impacts of leaving the EU may not shift opinions. Despite this might 
we dare to hope that more awareness of the potential impacts and trade-offs of leaving 
the EU may contribute to creating better-informed decision-makers and citizens, and 
in this ultimately enhance the democratic quality of ongoing deliberation about choices 
and outcomes? After all David Davis has stated ‘If a democracy cannot change its 
mind, it ceases to be a democracy’. Yet given the manner in which the prospect of 
leaving the EU has been planned for, those such as Davis who have willed this fate 
on the UK would do well to remember Peter Hall’s closing words in 1980 that ‘There 
may be some excuses for great planning disasters, but there are not nearly as many 
as we think’.  
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